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KEN-IcKY LAW JouNAL
SUFFICIENCY OF THE GENERAL OBJECTION IN KENTUCKY
It is the general rule in most, if not all, American jurisdictions that the grounds
for an objection in the trial court must be specifically stated before an appellate
court will consider them, and a general objection, if overruled, raises no question
which can be considered on appeal.' To this general rule there are some excep-
tions. Where the evidence could not have been admissible for any purpose what-
ever, in its relation to the rest of the case, a general objection is sufficient to enable
an appellate court to consider the question. A general objection has also been
held sufficient where the defect or error complained of could not have been ob-
viated in the trial court even if the grounds for the objection had been stated.'
Where it is clear that the court and the opposing counsel understood the ground
that the objecting counsel had in mind, so that the point urged on appeal was
fairly presented and ruled upon in the trial court, there would seem to be no
reason to hold a general objection insufficient to raise that ground on appeal.' In
1 WGIGMORE, EVIDENCE sec. 18 (3rd ed. 1940); GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TEcHNiQUE secs.
417 419 (1935): 3 JONES, EVIDENCE sec. 893a (4th ed. 1938); 1 THoMPilSON, TRIALS Sec.
693 (2nd ed. 1912). "It has become a trite commonplace of the rules of appellate
procedure that a general objection, in a case where the evidence is competent for
any purpose, may not be laid in the record below (to use a homely simile) as an
egg to hatch later in the appellate court into precise and definite objections-
objections the point to which was concealed from the trial court and from opposing
counsel, and first come out of ambush and into sunlight in briefs to this court."
Bragg v. Metropolitan St. Ry. 192 Mo. 331, -- 91 S. W 527, 530 (1905).
" WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 18; 3 JONES, op. cit. supra note I, sec.
893b; I THOiPSON, op. cit supra note 1, sec. 697. Courts and text writers have had
a tendency to state this exception in general terms without defining its limits ,and
the courts are not completely clear as to how far it does extend. For example, ii
case of a general objection to hearsay evidence, it has been held to be within the
exception, Huston v. Johnson, 29 N. D. 546, 151 N. W 774 (1915), and has been
held not to be within the exception, Gagnon v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 208 Mass.
547, 92 N. E. 761 (1910); see C. C. Snyder Cigar & Tobacco Co. v. Stutts, 214 Ala.
132, 107 So. 73, 75 (1926). It would seem from the cases, however, that the
exception is usually applied where the evidence is clearly immaterial or irrelevant,
or where it is the sort of evidence that is never admissible, and this should be the
proper limits of this exception. GOLDSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. -119, contains
an extensive listing of situations in which courts have held a general objection
insufficient. Among them are: where the evidence offered is not the best evidence:
that documentary evidence offered is incompetent for any reason; that a proper
foundation has not been laid for the admissiomn of exhibits; where hypothetical ques-
tions are defective; where the question calls for privileged communication; where
the evidence is hearsay; where the document offered is self-serving; where the evi-
dence violates the parol evidence rtle. While there are cases contrary to some of
the situations he names, illustration is still, perhaps, the most accurate and illumi-
native way of determining the limits of this exception. Unless it is strictly limited
and unless the decisions of a few courts placing some of the above situations within
it are rejected, this exception might easily be used to such a degree that it would
consume the rule.
3 Clauser v. Stone, 29 Ill. 114 (1862); Bowdle v. Jencks, 18 S. D. 80, 99 N. IV. 98
(1904); see Blackwelder v. Rock Island Lumber Mfg. Co., 9 Kan. A. 664, 58 Pac.
1019 (1899); Merritt v. Seaman, 6 N. Y. 168, 171 (1852); 4 C. J. S. 499; GoLnsrNl,,
op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 418.4 Johnson v. U. S., 163 Fed. 30 (C. C. A. 1st 1908); Peters v. Consolidated Fgt.
Lines, 157 Or. 605, 73 P 2d 713 (1937); see Sparks v. Oklahoma, 146 Fed. 371, 371
(C. C. A. 8th 1906); Guarantee Co. of North America v. Phenix Ins. Co., 124 Fed.
170, 175 (C. C. A. 8th 1903); People v. Beach, 87 N. Y 508, 513 (1882). It may lie
that this is tacitly accepted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals and is the basis of
the belief held by some Kentucky lawyers that a general objection is always sufficient,
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that situation, the objection is actually a specific objection, since a specific ground
was understood although it was not, in fact, stated. If a general objection is sus-
tained in the trial court, just as in the situation where a specific objection is sus-
tained on untenable grounds, it will be sufficient on appeal if there is any ground
upon which the objection might have been held valid." In this note, when "gen-
eral objection" is used, the general objection overruled and subject to these
exceptions is meant.
Many Kentucky lawyers are of the opinion that a general objection is suffi-
cient in Kentucky. It is the purpose of this note to investigate the law of this
state regarding such an objection. No Kentucky decision was found by the writer
directly stating that as a general rule, the general objection either is or is not suffi-
cient. But objections at a trial are made in many vaned and particular situations,
,nd the Kentucky Court has held a general objection insufficient to save the ques-
tion for review in several of these situations. Where evidence is admissible only
for a certain purpose, a general objection to such evidence does not allow the
objecting party to raise the question on appeal either as to the admissibility of the
evidence or as to the failure of the court to admonish the jury that the evidence
Nvas admitted only for a certain purpose.' This is also true where evidence is
admissible against one defendant but is not admissible against the other.- A gen-
eral objection to,' or a motion to exclude' the whole of some evidence, part of
which is competent and part of which is not, will not be considered on appeal as
raising a question as to the incompetent part, nor will such an objection to the
whole testimony of a witness, when part of it is competent.'" It has more recently
been held that this is also true of a general objection to a question, part of which
is competent and part of which is not." In two Kentucky cases,"2 there are dicta
to the effect that an objection to the competency of a witness must point out to
the court the particular ground for the objection, and an objecion to the general
competency of a witness is not sufficient where any testimony of the witness is
-'NVIGCMORI', op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 18.
1 Brown v. Simpson, 293 Ky. 755, 170 S. W 2d 345 (1943); Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
v. Boyd's Adinr., 290 Ky. 9, 160 S. W 2d 342 (1942); Bartlett v. Vanover, 260 K'".
839. 86 S. W 2d 1020 (1935); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Scott's Admr., 188 Ky. 99, 2 O
S. W. 1066 (1920).
1 Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves, 261 Ky. 539, 88 S. V. 2d 39 (1935);
Nichols v. Lusters Admir., 259 Ky. 379, 82 S. W 2d 498 (1935) (not clear whether
(,bjection was general, or was specific but specified another ground).
'Ham v. Miss C. E. Mason's School, 249 Ky. 478, 61 S. W 2d 7 (1933); Meade v.
Com.. 225 Ky. 177, 7 S. W 2d 1052 (1928); Hoskins v. Com., 188 Ky. 80, 221 S. V
230 (1920): Harrod v. Armstrong, 177 Ky. 317 197 S. W 816 (1917): see Perkins v.
Com., 263 Kv. 760, 763, 93 S. W. 2d 832, 834 (1936); Cochran v. Com., 236 Ky. 284,
288, 33 S. W 2d 30, 32 (1930).
' Madden v. Com., 237 Ky. 703, 36 S. W 2d 346 (1931); Ellis v. Com., 146 Ky.
715, 143 S. W. 425 (1912).
I" Board of Education of Jackson v. Caudill, 228 Ky. 652, 15 S. V 2d 452 (1929);
Watson and Kelly Caudill v. Com., 217 Ky. 403, 289 S. W 371 (1926): Green v. Com.,
207 Ky. 188, 268 S. W. 1081 (1925); Morehead v. Com., 194 Ky. 592, 240 S. W. 93
(1922); Lowery v. Com., 191 Ky. 657 231 S. W 234 (1921); Hall v. Com., 189 Ky.
72, 221 S. W 492 (1920); Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 177 Ky. 698, 198
S. W 51 (1917).
"Jones v. Com., 250 Ky. 217, 62 S. IV 2d 56 (1933). Contra: Sodusky v. McGee,
28 Ky. 621 (1831).
N'Nunn v. Slemnions' Adiur., 298 Ky. 315, 318, 182 S. W 2d 888, 889 (194-1):
Hcmbrece v. Com., 210 Ky. 333, 334, 275 S. W 812, 813 (1925).
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admissible. A general objection to a deposition does not save the question as to
the incompetent part when some of it is competent."
In all of these situations, the objection was general because it failed to point
out the particular thing objected to. These represent a special type of situation
and it would not necessarily be inconsistent to require a specific objection in these
situations and not require it in the situations where a particular thing was objected
to but no grounds were stated for the objection. But there have been several
cases of the latter type where such an objection was held insufficient. In Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. v. Burton," a ground relied upon on appeal was that the evi-
dence was introduced out of place. Although it is not clear whether the objection
was general or was specific and specified another ground, what the court said
would be applicable in either case. " We do not find in the record that the
evidence was for that reason (Italics writer s) objected to by appellant, in
view of which such objection will not be heard on appeal."'L One Kentucky case"
held that a failure to put a document in evidence from which a witness read was
not sufficient to cause a reversal where there were no grounds stated for the ob-
jection in the trial court. But it appears that the Court's feeling that the appellant
was not prejudiced by the failure may also be a basis for the decision. In Fenston
v. Commonwealth," the error complained of was the failure to read the whole of
a letter, part of which was read. It is not clear whether the appellant even ob-
jected generally, but the implication is that he would have had to object on that
ground. It has also been held that objections to arguments of counsel" and ob-
jections to the court's limiting the arguments of counsel" must be specific, and a
motion to discharge the jury should point out the reasons.' An objection to a
judgment should point out errors in the judgment." While there are many parti-
cular situations upon which no Kentucky decisions were found, most of those
situations are not distinguishable in pnnciple from several of the last situations
mentioned above.
There is one Kentucky case, Duff Construction Co. v. Alford," which seems
to be clearly contrary to the general rule. The appellant's motion to exclude the
answer of a witness to a question was overruled. The Court of Appeals held that
although it seemed that the motion and the court's ruling were based solely upon
one ground, the answer was inadmissible because of another ground urged upon
Hardin v. Robinson, 243 Ky. 648, 49 S. W. 2d 563 (1932); Bronston's Admr. N.
Bronston's Heirs, 141 Ky. 639, 133 S. W 584 (1911); Louisville & Cincinnati Packet
Co. v. Bottorff, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1324, 77 S. V 920 (1904); Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Montgomery, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 807, 32 S. W 738 (1895) ("defendant excepts and ob.jects to the reading of each question and answer"); Hedger v. Reed, 5 Ky. L. Rep,
513 (Super. Ct. 1883) (abstract); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Graves' Assignee, 78 Ky.
74 (1879).
1 156 Ky. 736, 161 S. IV 1116 (1914).
IId. at 740, 161 S. W at 1118.
"Terrell v. Flack's Admr., 236 Ky. 325, 33 S. W 2d 23 (1930).
182 Ky. 549 (1885).
"Huber & Huber Motor Express v. Martin's Admr., 265 Ky. 228, 96 S. W 2d
595 (1936); cf McClemand v. Com., 11 Ky. L. Rep. 301, 12 S. W 148 (1889); see
Franklin v. Com., 266 Ky. 833, 837 100 S. W 2d 690, 692 (1936).,
"Williams v. Com., 6 Ky. L. Rep. 764, 82 Ky. 640 (1885).
"Smith v. Treacy, 294 Ky. 680, 172 S. IV 2d 570 (1943).
'Clark's Adm'x. v. Callahan, 216 Ky. 674, 288 S. XV 301 (1926).
149 Ky. 594, 149 SXV 943 (1912).
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appeal, and the Court reversed because the testimony was very prejudicial to the
cause. While this case is perhaps more properly classed as a case where the objec-
tion was specific and another ground than that specified was urged and considered
on appeal, the reasons for the rule against allowing reliance upon different grounds
on appeal than those relied upon in the trial court are about the same as the
reasons against allowing the general objection, and if the former were allowed by
the Kentucky Court, there would seem to be no reason why the latter should not
be allowed also. The net effect of allowing either an objection on insufficient
grounds or a general objection for which no grounds were stated to be sufficient
to allow any grounds to be relied upon on appeal would be the same, and the
principles which forbid one would forbid the other. No other Kentucky case was
found by the writer allowing a changing of grounds on appeal where a specific
objection was made in the trial court, and some of the cases previously discussed
required that the ground relied upon an appeal must have been stated in the trial
court. Nor was any Kentucky case found approving or following this case. There
is also a Kentucky case in which a general objection to the signing of a bill of
exceptions by a judge other than the trial judge was held sufficient'-but it is not
even clear that any objection would have been necessary to raise this question on
appeal, least of all, a specific objection. While there is dictum in this case' which
would appear to support a contention that a general objection is always sufficient,
in light of the facts of the case, this dictum is of little value.
In addition to the holdings of the cases discussed before, there are statements
in some Kentucky cases which lend support to the view that a general objection
is not sufficient. In Oclsner v. Commonwealth,' the Court of Appeals, while
speaking of the necessity for exceptions, said, "If the trial court's attention were
called at the time to what is frequently a mere omission, it would have been
corrected. To allow reversal for such lapses is to put a premium upon sharpness,
rather than tend to the just and fair admimstration of the law." While this was
not said regarding the general objection, it does show the Court's recognition of an
evil which is also present if a general objection is deemed sufficient. In Hines v.
Car,' the Court said, while discussing the necessity for an objection, "The pur-
pose of an objection is to call a matter to the court's attention that it may have
an opportunity to consider the question and rule thereon. The framers of pro-
cedural rules have never attributed legal omniscience to judges but such rules are
rooted in a realization of human fallibility and failure to accord the court an oppor-
tunity to rule on a question is ordinarily regarded as a waiver of error with refer-
ence thereto."-" Again, although this was not said about the general objection, it
does show the Court's recognition as an evil, one of the necessary results of a rule
allowing a general objection.
There is abundant Kentucky authority for the proposition that, as a general
rule, a point of law not raised in the trial court will not be considered by the
"'Pittsburgh C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Austin's Admr., 143 Ky. 70, 135 S. WV
4113 (1911).
I-'d. at 71, 135 S. IV. at 413.
128 Ky. 761, 109 S. IV 326 (1908).
'Id. at 767 109 S. W at 327.
-'296 Ky. 78, 176 S. IV 2d 99 (1913).
I'[d, at 81, 176 S. V 2d at 100.
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appellate court. Since the argument against the general objection is based upon
the same principle-that an appeal court should not consider any specific point
unless that specific point was raised and ruled on by the trial court-these Ken-
tucky cases tend to support the argument against the general objection. The
theory and pnnciple behind the two propositions is the same. It is doubtful
whether any argument in support of the sufficiency of the general objection would
not also apply to support contention that a point does not need to be raised or
saved in the trial court in order to be reviewed on appeal.
There are several reasons for the rule against general objections. The writer
has attempted to classify the reasons advanced by the courts, but there remains a
certain amount of overlapping. Probably the most important and obvious reason
for requiring specific objections is to give the other party an opportunity to cor-
rect the error complained of at the time it is made, if capable of correction, so
that there would be no necessity for an appeal, reversal, and new trial. "The
object is really to avoid techmcalities, and prevent delay in the administra-
tion of justice. When evidence is offered to which there is some objection, sub-
stantial justice requires that the objection be specified, so that the party offering
the evidence can remove it, if possible, and let the case be tried on its merits. If
it is objected that the question is leading, the form may be changed; if that the
evidence is irrelevant, the relvancy may be shown; if that it is incompetent, the
incompetency may be removed; if that it is immaterial, its materiality may be
established; if to the order of introduction, it may be withdrawn and offered at
another time, and thus appeals could often be saved, delays avoided, and sub-
stantial justice administered."' Similar to that argument is the one that a general
objection is actually an invitation for error. "A judge is not to be burdened
with the duty of searching for objections to an inquiry put by counsel, which the
opposing counsel is himself unable to discover, or which, if apparent to Is own
mind, he sees fit to conceal, for no other purpose, apparently, than to prevent a
full consideration of the objection, and with the ultimate intent to take advantage
of an error, in case of defeat, which might have been avoided if his views of the
matter had been fairly and candidly expressed at the proper time."'  Another
argument is that an attorney has a duty to the court to state the grounds of his
objection, and conversely, that the court has a right to have he grounds of an
objecion stated to it. "It is the duty of every attorney, engaged in the presenta-
tion of a cause to a court, to assist in reaching a just conclusion by stating fully
and frankly to the court, when requested, all that he knows about the question
under consideration. A court has the right to have the errors com-
2 Johnson v. Dodd's Admr., 238 Ky. 194, 37 S. W 2d 26 (1931); Hofgesang v.
Silver, 232 Ky. 503, 23 S. NV 2d 945 (1930); Louisville SL N. R. R. v. Smith's Admr.,
203 Ky. 513, 263 S. IV 29 (1923); Levy v. Doerhofer's Ex'r., 188 Ky. 413, 222 S. W.
515 (1920): Com. v. Fenwick, 177 Ky. 685, 198 S. W. 32 (1917); Frogg v. Com., 163
Ky. 175, 173 S. W 383 (1915); McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S. 1V 742 (1912);
Moreland's Admr. v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 114 Ky. 577 71 S. IV. 520 (1903).
- "Neither can we allow them to strike between wind and water on the trial,
and then go home to their books, and study out other objections, and urge them
here. They must stand or fall upon the case they made below, for this court is not
a forum to discuss new points of this character, but simply a court of review to
determine whether the rulings of the court below on the case as presented were cor-
rect or not" Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. 99, -- 25 Pac. 816, 823 (1874).
3
1 Id. at -- 25 Pac. at 822.
"Bundy v. Hyde, 50 N. I-L 16, 121 (1870).
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plained of pointed out fully and clearly, and concealment or evasion of pertinent
facts by the attorney is a violation of professional duty which will justify a refusal
of the order requested."' "Such general objections were well calculated to em-
barrass the court, and put it at disadvantage in its conduct of the trial. It was
entitled to know the grounds of the objection, so that the jury could be put in
possession of the real case to be tried."' Another reason for the rule against
general objection is that to allow it would either make a trial too long or make a
new trial necessary, which is unfair to the adverse party, the court, and to other
litigants with suits pending. "He must not merely complain in a general way, and
say that to let certain evidence in will hurt his case, and that, under the law, it
ought to be excluded, and leave the judge and the opposite side in the dark as
to what pnnciple of law he relies on, and compel them to decide hap-hazard, or
else stop the trial of the cause with a jury waiting, while the counsel examine
the whole body of the law, from the earliest judicial expositions down to the latest
act of the legislature, to see if they can discover any valid objection to the testi-
mony. The opposing counsel can make no reply to a general objection except to
throw the whole responsibility upon the judge at once, or else begin systematically,
and argue that under any possible objection the testimony should come in. Many
trials under such a system would practically never end. The effect of it would be
to compel one party to fight in the dark, not knowing when his opponent intended
to strike, while the other would be free to choose his weapons, and the time and
place to use them. Such things may do in love or war, where all things are said
to be fair; but life is too short to transact business on such a system in courts of
justice. ' : " It could not be expected, upon the mere suggestion of an ex-
ception that the court should explore the entire mass for the ascertainment
of defects which the objector himself either would not or could not point to their
view." It has been said that a rule allowing a general objection would actually
result in having appellate courts try the cases over again. "Such a rule would
level the appellate courts to the position of trial courts, would overturn all just
conceptions of appellate procedure in cases at law, and would result in making
the heanng of an appeal in such an action a trial de novo, without the presence
of witnesses or the means of obviating errors or omissions.'-
Because the Kentucky Court of Appeals has held the general objection in-
sufficient in many situations, including some where the objection was directed at
a particular thing; because there was no Kentucky authority to the contrary found,
Bailey v. Riverside Tp., 82 Kan. 429, 431, 108 Pac. 796, 797 (1910).
' District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U. S. 450, 462 (1889).
a Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. 99, -- 25 Pac. 816, 822 (1874). "It has not hitherto
been allowed to nisi prius judge-a puisne judge-to have been so successful in
'Mastering the rawless science of our law,
That codeless myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances,
-that he has the whole body of the law at his fingers' ends, so to speak, for instan-
taneous and automatic application, ex mero motu, without having his attention
directed by counsel to some specific legal principle or some specific fact controlled
by such principle. Only appellate courts, it is modestly believed, are so endowed,
and even this has been a subject of sharp discussion and possible doubt, and, per-
adventure, should be stated cautiously and taken 'cuni grano salis. " Bragg v.
Metropolitan St. Ry., 192 Mo. 331, 91, SAV 527, 531 (1905).
'Cainden v. Doremus, 3 How. 515, 530 (U. S. 1845).
I TIoNmso-,, TRIALS sec. 693, p. 632 (2nd ed. 1912).
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except perhaps a single case;' because of the great strength of the reasons for the
rule, and the fact that the Kentucky Court, although it was not talking about the
general objection, has recogmzed and condemned as evil some of the evils which
would result from allowing the general objection; and because Kentucky is clearly
committed to the general principle that it will not consider, on appeal, questions
not raised in the lower court, which principle would be violated by allowing the
general objection, it is submitted that Kentucky follows the general rule that a
general objection, if overruled, raises no question which can be considered on
appeal. If it be true that, in practice, a general objection is sufficient in Kentucky,
such a practice seems to have little, if any basis in principle, reason, authority, or
precedent.
' AmrEs C. BLAIR
'Supra note 22
